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BEYOND BETAMAX AND BROADCAST:
HOME RECORDING FROM PAY




A modem dilemma: A movie you have been waiting to see will
be shown tonight on Home Box Office ("HBO"), or some other pre-
mium cable channel. Or perhaps your favorite team is in the basket-
ball play-offs on the Electronic Sports Programming Network
("ESPN"). Or a critically acclaimed mini-series is on one of the ba-
sic cable channels. But you have to work late, and won't be home
until after the movie, game, or show is over. You consider setting
your video cassette recorder ("VCR") to record the program for
later viewing at a more convenient time. Copyright infringement?
Or fair use?
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America
("Betamax III"),' the Supreme Court held that home videotaping for
time-shifting purposes is a lawful "fair use" of copyrighted televi-
sion programs. The Court concluded: "One may search the Copy-
right Act in vain for any sign that the elected representatives of the
millions of people who watch television every day have made it un-
lawful to copy a program for later viewing at home ... ."2 The
specific facts of that case involved the private home use of VCRs for
recording programs broadcast over-the-air without charge.3 The
Court noted that, "[n]o issue concerning... the copying of programs
transmitted on pay or cable television systems was raised." 4
* Associate, McDermott, Will & Emery, Washington, D.C.; B.A. 1984, McGill
University (Great Distinction); J.D. 1989, George Washington University National
Law Center (Highest Honors). McDermott, Will & Emery represents manufacturers
of audio and video recorders and other consumer electronics products. This Arti-
cle, however, reflects only the present considerations of the author, and not neces-
sarily those of any client.
The author is indebted to Robert S. Schwartz for his constructive suggestions and
intellectual generosity through several drafts of this Article, to Seth D. Greenstein
for his copyright expertise and time-shift scenerios, and to both for their support,
assistance, and insights during the writing of this Article, and otherwise.
1. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
2. Id. at 456.
3. Id. at 425.
4. Id.; accord id. at 458 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Likewise, the trial court
did not decide whether copying from pay television is prohibited. Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America (Betamax I), 480 F.Supp. 429, 433 (C.D.
Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981) (Betamax 11), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417
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Consider the issue now raised. Recent figures show that VCRs are
currently used in approximately three-quarters of U.S. homes.' Fur-
thermore, cable and pay television services are becoming prolific.'
Cable television service is now available to more than ninety per-
cent of American households, with approximately sixty percent of
U.S. homes actually paying to receive cable service.7 Pay television
programming is also available via direct satellite transmission to in-
dividual subscribers8 and via multiple-channel microwave distribu-
(1984) (Betamax 11i). The trial court stated that: "It is important to note the limits of
this suit. Neither pay nor cable television stations are plaintiffs in this suit and no
defendant recorded the signals from either." Id. at 442. Accordingly, the court's
ruling was based on "home use recording'-the use of a VCR in a private home to
record programs broadcast free to the public over public airwaves for subsequent
home viewing. Id.
5. Patrick M. Reilly, Camcorder Makers, With Growth Easing, Try to Bring
New Markets Into the Picture, WAu, ST. J., Dec. 26, 1991, at B1 (stating that 74% of
U.S. homes have VCRs, and 97% of U.S. homes have color television sets; in com-
parison, only 14% of American homes have video camcorders); Pay Cable Penetra-
tion, TmwtsioN Dio., Jan. 27, 1992, at 10 (citing Nielson report that VCR
penetration reached 73.3% in November 1991); VCR Penetration, TELEVMISION DIG.,
Oct. 14, 1991, at 5 (estimating VCR penetration at 78.2% of U.S. TV homes (Arbi-
tron Report)).
6. See generally Paul Farhi, Fighting for a Leading Edge on the Future: Cable
TV, Phone Firms Compete for Control of Tomorrow's Technology, WASH. POST, Jan.
24, 1992, at Al, A14 (describing present and future television and telecommunica-
tions technologies); David E. Leibowitz, The Sequential Distribution of Television
Programming in a Dynamic Marketplace, 34 CATH. U. L. Rxv. 671 (1985).
7. Paul Farhi, Reregulating Cable: A Political Response to a Wired Nation,
WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1992, at Al, A14 (stating that 58% of all households, about 54
million households in all, receive cable); VCR Penetration, supra note 5, at 5 (esti-
mating that 63.8% of U.S. households subscribe to cable). Similarly, a survey of the
top 100 cable operators showed that 59.53% of homes passed by cable subscribed
to basic cable services; 74.49% of these subscribers (i.e., 44.34% of all homes
passed by cable) subscribe to pay cable services. Top 100 Basics Growing Again,
Pay Units Improve Slightly, TELEsvSoN Dio., Nov. 18, 1991, at 1-2. Nielson reports
pay cable penetration at 28.1% in November 1991. Pay Cable Penetration, supra
note 5, 1992, at 10.
8. As of 1991, approximately 3.4 million households owned home satellite
dishes. Satellite television provides access to over 80 subscription services, such as
HBO, The Disney Channel, Cinemax and other movie channels, ESPN and other
sports networks, Cable News Network ("CNN"), and television "superstations,"
among other programming services. Oversight Hearing on Copy7ight and Tele-
communications Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property & Judicial Adminis-
tration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (written
statement of Andrew R. Paul, Sr. Vice President, Satellite Broadcasting and Com-
munications Association, Appendix A). Technological developments have enabled
home dish owners to intercept satellite-delivered signals that were originally in-
tended to be distributed only to cable systems. Consequently, most resale satellite
carriers now encode or scramble their signals and provide descrambling devices to
home dish owners who pay to subscribe to their television programming service.
H.R. REP. No. 887(1), 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5611, 5615.
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tion systems, the so-called "wireless cable" companies.9
In addition, some cable and satellite operators offer pay-per-view
("PPV") services where the subscriber is charged on a per-program
basis for certain programs and movies, such as major sporting events
and feature films. As of mid-1991, approximately twenty million
homes were equipped to receive PPV; the number of homes capable
of receiving PPV through cable or satellite delivery is expected to
double by 1995.10 Hereinafter, all television programming received
via cable, satellite, or microwave, including PPV services, will be
referred to generically as "pay television" or "pay TV."
With the increase in both VCR ownership and in reception of pay
television services, the issue of home taping from non-broadcast
television signals is drawing increased attention.11 In an attempt to
squelch copying from cable, some motion picture distributors, video
software dealers, and other copyright interests would like pay televi-
sion signals protected by anti-copy coding to prevent all unauthor-
ized home recording or, alternatively, to require additional
remuneration from home viewers who record the television signal.1 2
In contrast, some consumers and consumer electronics manufactur-
ers assert that the non-commercial "fair use" upheld in Betamax I
9. About 400,000 households subscribe to multiple-channel microwave distri-
bution systems. In this system, microwave or "wireless cable" companies receive
satellite-delivered programming and then transmit it by microwave beam directly
to individual subscribers. The subscribers pick up the microwave signal with home
receiving dishes; no hard wire cable is involved. See Fari, supra note 6, at A14.
10. Hearing on S. 1096, Motion Picture Anti-Piracy Act of 1991 Before the Sub-
comm. on Technology and the Law, joint with the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights
and Trademarks, of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1991) (written Statement of Richard S. Leghorn, President, Eidak Corporation).
[hereinafter Leghorn Statement].
11. See, e.g., Home Copying Hard to Get Economic Handle On, Bu-nomm, Dec.
14, 1991, at 54.
12. See, e.g., Paul Sweeting, Taping From Standard Vs. PPV Cable Is Ad-
dressed in Survey, Buaoimm, Feb. 10, 1990, at 51; Home Copying Hard to Get
Economic Handle On, supra note 11, at 54; Anti-Copy System Finding Vid-Dealer
Favor, Bnaomin, Dec. 7, 1991, at 6; Hearing on S. 1096, Motion Picture Anti-
Piracy Act of 1991 Before the Subcomm. on Technology and the Law, joint with the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1991) (testimony of Timothy A. Boggs, Vice
President, Time Warner Inc., on behalf of the Motion Picture Association of
America).
According to one video software executive, "Basically we don't think people
should copy tapes. We're against copying. But at the same time, we think the pro-
gramming aired on Showtime, the Movie Channel, the Disney Channel, and HBO
should be copy-encrypted, too. We're for copy protection globally." Arm-Copy
SYSTEM Fummo Vm-DEwxR FAVOR, supra note 12, at 85 (quoting Blockbuster En-
tertainment Sr. Vice President Ron Castell).
Similarly, another video dealer opines: "The cable channels exploit home tap-
ing. Our chapter considers home taping another form of piracy." Home Copying
Hard to Get Economic Handle On, supra note 11, at 54 (quoting Rich Thorward,
1992]
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extends likewise to consumers' private, non-commercial recording
from pay television. Under this view, they protest measures that
would indiscriminately prevent or control consumer home video re-
cording from pay TV signals."3
In response to the growing public debate, Congress is now con-
sidering several legislative initiatives that could impact on home
copying from non-broadcast television services. The "Motion Pic-
ture Anti-Piracy Act of 1991," for example, would create an exclu-
sive right for copyright owners to prevent all unauthorized copying
of an audiovisual work through the use of special treatments or
mechanisms that inhibit copying; anti-copy coding of video signals
is one such mechanism. 4 In contrast, the "Cable Equipment Act of
1992" would prohibit cable operators from scrambling or otherwise
encrypting local broadcast signals that are delivered as part of
cable service. 15
This Article examines whether home video-re.ording from pay
television services should be considered "fair use" or copyright in-
fringement. Part I briefly summarizes relevant copyright law. Part I
reviews the facts and findings of the Befamax litigation regarding
home recording and fair use.'" Part III outlines post-Betamax devel-
opments in the doctrine of fair use. Part IV provides further analysis
of the factors considered under the fair use doctrine. Finally, Part V
argues that under the doctrine of fair use, consumers have the right
to record any television signal they lawfully acquire for private non-
commercial use. This Article concludes that any legislative meas-
ures enacted should be carefully fashioned to uphold the "fair use"
of copyrighted audiovisual works.
former head of the New York/New Jersey chapter of the Video Software Dealers
Association).
This view is at odds with video software dealers' earlier enthusiasm about home
taping and the growth of the VCR industry.
13. See, e.g., Letter from Gary J. Shapiro, Chairman, Home Recording Rights
Coalition, to the Honorable Herbert H. Kohl, United States Senator (Aug. 23, 1991)
(regarding July 24, 1991 Joint Hearing of Subcommittees on Patents, Copyrights &
Trademarks and Technology & the Law on S. 1096).
14. S. 1096, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991) (introduced by Senator Herbert
Kohl of Wisconsin); accord H.R. 2367, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991) (compan-
ion House bill sponsored by Rep. Howard Berman of California).
15. Senate Amendment No. 1504, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 624A(d)1 (1992) (in-
troduced by Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont as an amendment to S. 12, the Cable
TV Consumer Protection Act, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)), reprinted in CoNG.
Bsc. S 582 (Jan. 29, 1992).
16. The main issue and holding in Betamax ll involved whether the sale of
VCRs to the public constitutes contributory infringement of copyrights. 464 U.S. at
420, 456. A discussion of the doctrine of contributory infringement, however, is




The United States Constitution empowers Congress "To promote
the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries."' 17 As the Supreme Court has stated,
"[c]reative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private mo-
tivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts."18
Accordingly, the goal of copyright law is delicately to balance
competing private and public interests.1 9 When new technology
raises new copyright issues, however, the scales must tip toward
public availability of creative works:
The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair
return for an "author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by
this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good. "The sole interest of the United States and the primary ob-
jective in conferring the monopoly ... lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors." When techno-
logical change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the
Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose.2 0
B. Statute
Section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides that the copy-
right owner has the exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, per-
form, and display the copyrighted work, as well as to prepare
derivative works based thereon.21 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
17. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. For a more complete discussion of the develop-
ment of copyright law, see Mary L. Mills, Note, .New Technology and the Limita-
nions of Copyright Law: An Argument for Finding Alternatives to Copyright
Legislation in an Era of Bapid Technological Change, 65 Cm.-KZRT L. REv. 307,
312-26 (1989).
18. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
19. See, e.g., Betamax II, 464 U.S. at 429 (noting that the challenge of copy-
right is to strike the "difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors
in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand,
and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and com-
merce on the other hand").
20. Id. at 432 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
21. Specifically, section 106 provides that:
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the pub-
lic by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
1992]
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has explained that this statutory grant of exclusive rights does not
afford the copyright owner complete control over all uses of the
work; the public may make some unauthorized uses of copyrighted
works.
The Copyright Act does not give a copyright holder control
over all uses of his copyrighted work. Instead, § 1 of the Act enu-
merates several "rights" that are made "exclusive" to the holder
of the copyright. If a person, without authorization from the copy-
right holder, puts a copyrighted work to a use within the scope of
one of these "exclusive rights," he infringes the copyright. If he
puts the work to a use not enumerated in § 1, he does not
infringe.
2 2
Significantly, the copyright holder's exclusive rights are subject to
the doctrine of fair use, codified in section 107 of the 1976 Copy-
right Act as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the
fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduc-
tion in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by
that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), schol-
arship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991).
22. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 393-95
(1968) (footnotes omitted).
As one commentator noted: "'The fundamental [is] that "use" is not the same
thing as "infringement," that use short of infringement is to be encouraged....'"
B. KAiLp, AN UmNunmxn View op CopymIoHr 57 (1967), quoted in Fortnightly, 392
U.S. at 393 n.8; accord Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 415
U.S. 394, 398 n.2 (1974).
In this sense, courts have long distinguished the rights granted by patent statutes.
E.g., Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1907); Bauer & Cie v.
O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1912). The patent statute provides the inventor with
"the exclusive right to make, use, and vend the invention or discovery." Id. at 16
(citations omitted). In contrast, the copyright act confers the exclusive rights to
make and to sell the copyrighted work, but does not confer the exclusive right to
use the subject work. Accordingly, copyright owners may not exclude others from
using the subject work nor control how others use it. Id.; Bobbs-Merzill, 210 U.S. at
350-51.
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(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality -of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.2
The four statutory factors are illustrative only-they are neither
exhaustive nor definitive. 2 4 Moreover, the statute gives no guidance
as to the relative weight of the factors.25 In codifying the judicial
doctrine of fair use, both the House and the Senate emphasized that
the doctrine must remain flexible to meet new situations created by
new technology:
The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some
guidance to users determining when the principles of the doctrine
apply. However, the endless variety of situations and combina-
tions of circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes
the formulation of exact rules in the statute. The bill endorses the
purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but
there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, espe-
cially during the period of rapid technological change. Beyond a
very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of
the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.2 8
C. Legislative History
The Copyright Act of 1909 was subject to its first comprehensive
revision in 1976. This overhaul was designed in large part to
amend the Copyright Act to conform to the significant changes in
technologies since the 1909 Act was crafted. These changes in-
cluded, of course, the advent of motion pictures, sound recordings,
radio, and television.2 7 After an extensive review of the congres-
sional deliberations, the Betamax trial court concluded that "legisla-
tive history shows an intent to allow home-use copying of both
23. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). Enacted in the 1976 revisions to the Copyright
Act, section 107 gave express statutory recognition for the first time to the judicial
doctrine of fair use. H.R. REP. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 107 with Williams & Wil-
kdns Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct. C1. 1973) (listing the same four
factors for fair use nearly verbatim), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court,
420 U.S. 376 (1975). The House and Senate Reports state that "[s]ection 107 is
intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow,
or enlarge it in any way." H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 66.
24. M vma B. NnmRmw DAVID Nunmvam, Nnmz-R ON COPYRIGHT § 13.051A], at
13-82.1 & n.15 (1991).
25. Betamax , 480 F. Supp. at 429; NnadER, supra note 24, at 13-82.1.
26. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 66; see also S. REP. No. 473, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1975).
27. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 47.
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sound recordings and broadcasted audiovisual material."
28
In the legislative process leading up to the major Copyright Act
revision, Congress enacted the Sound Recording Amendment of
1971 to provide immediate relief for the more urgent problem of
commercial record piracy.29 This 1971 amendment was merged
into the new 1976 Copyright Act without any suggestion that its leg-
islative intent had changed. Therefore, its legislative history is in-
structive in interpreting the meaning of the 1976 Act's provisions.
3 0
Significantly, the legislative history shows that Congress had no in-
tention of restraining home recording for private, noncommercial
use.
The House Report that accompanied the 1971 Sound Recording
amendment stated:
Home Recording
In approving the creation of a limited copyright in sound re-
cordings it is the intention of the Committee that this limited copy-
right not grant any broader rights than are accorded to other
copyright proprietors under the existing title 17. Specifically, it is
not the intention of the Committee to restrain the home recording,
from broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded perform-
ances, where the home recording is for private use and with no
purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalimng commercially on
it. This practice is common and unrestrained today, and the rec-
ord producers and performers would be in no different position
from that of the owners of copyright in recorded musical composi-
tions over the past 20 years.
3 1
Furthermore, dialogue in floor debate -3 2 and committee hear-
28. Betamax I, 480 F. Supp. at 447.
29. Id. at 443-44.
30. See id. at 444-45.
31. H.R. BP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971), reprinted in 1971
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1572 (emphasis added).
32. The following colloquy occurred on the House floor:
MB. KAZEN. Am I correct in assuming that the bill protects copyrighted
material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only?
MR. KASTENMEIER. Yes.
MR. KAZEN. In other words, if your child were to record off of a pro-
gram which comes through the air on the radio or television, and then
used it for her own personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this would not
be included under the penalties of this bill?
MR. KASTENMEIER. This is not included in the bill. I am glad the gen-
tleman raises the point.
On page 7 of the report, under "Home Recordings," Members will note
that under the bill the same practice which prevails today is called for;
namely, this is considered both presently and under the proposed law to
be fair use. The child does not do this for commercial purposes. This is
made clear in the report.
117 Cong. Rec. 34,748 (1971), quoted in Betamar 1, 480 F. Supp. at 446.
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ings3 3 regarding the Sound Recording Amendment also demon-
strates that Congress did not intend to outlaw noncommercial home
recording with either audio or video recorders. Eventually, the
United States Supreme Court confirmed this view with regard to
home video recording.
I. BETAMAX: THE VCR WARS BEGIN
The Betamax case was spawned in 1976 by a proposal for a
catchy campaign slogan: "NOW YOU DON'T HAVE TO MISS
KOJAK BECAUSE YOU'RE WATCHING COLUMBO (OR VICE
VERSA)." The would-be ad ended with the words "BETAMAX-
IT'S A SONY."'3 4 The executives at Universal Pictures were not
amused.35
In late 1976, Universal Pictures and Walt Disney Productions,
33. In June 1971 subcommittee hearings, Representative Beister engaged in the
following dialogue with Barbara Ringer, then Assistant Register of Copyrights:
MR. BEISTER. I do not know that I can add very much to the questions
which you have been asked so far.
I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own home.
My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particular record becomes
a hit, he will retrieve it onto his little set.
Now, he may retrieve in addition something else onto his recording, but
nonetheless, he does retrieve the basic sound, and this legislation, of
course, would not point to his activities, would it?
MISS RINGER. I think the answer is clearly, "No, it would not."
I have spoken at a couple of seminars on video cassettes lately, and this
question is usually asked: "What about the home recorders?"
The answer I have given and will give again is that this is something you
cannot control. You simply cannot control it.
Hearings on S. 646 before the Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Judiciary Comm., 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (June 9 and 10, 1971), [hereinafter "Hearings"], quoted in
Betamax 1, 480 F. Supp. at 445.
In her testimony following, Ms. Ringer distinguished the problem of public distri-
bution of unauthorized copies ("bootlegging") from private home use. Ringer rec-
ognized that Congress may want to address unauthorized public distribution in the
future, yet she stated that this threat could not be addressed by carrying copyright
enforcement into the home or by banning devices for off-the-air recording. Id. ("I
do not see anybody going into anyone's home and preventing this sort of thing, or
forcing legislation that would engineer a piece of equipment not to allow home
taping." (quoting Ms. Ringer)) Hearings, supra, at 22-23; see also REOmTER OF COPY-
IoHT, REPORT ON CopYma T LAW RvsioN 30 (July 1961) ("New technical devices
will probably make it practical in the future to reproduce televised motion pictures
in the home. We do not believe the private use of such a reproduction can or
should be precluded by copyright."), quoted in Betamax 1, 480 F. Supp. at 446.
34. See James Lardner, Annals of Law: The Betamax Case 1, NEw YoRumu, Apr.
6, 1987, at 45.
35. For a complete discussion of the factual background for the Betamax litiga-
tion, see generally id. (first part of two-part article); James Lardner, Annals of Law:
The Betamax Case II, NEw Yopmu, Apr. 13, 1987, at 60 (second part of two-part
article); see also JamSs LmsNm, F;isT FoRWARD: HoLywooD, THE JAPANSEs, m THm
VCR Wjs (1987) (detailing history and development of the VCR industry).
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creators and copyright holders of audiovisual works, brought suit,
charging that the videotaping of movies and television programs off-
the-air was a violation of copyright law."6 These plaintiffs sought an
injunction against the sale and distribution of the Betamax VCR to
prevent future infringement.3 7
A. First Run Theatre: The District Court Opinion
"After three years of litigation, five weeks of trial and careful con-
sideration of extensive briefing by both sides," s3 the district court
held that an individual's off-the-air home video recording of copy-
righted television programs for private, noncommercial use consti-
tutes "fair use," and therefore is not copyright infringement.3 9
In contrast to prior "fair use" cases, the Betamax I court empha-
sized two factors: (1) copying was done by individuals in the pri-
vacy of their own homes for use in their homes, and (2) the programs
copied were voluntarily sold by the copyright holders for broadcast
free of charge over the public airwaves.40 The court pretermitted
issues such as recording from pay or cable television, tape swap-
ping, tape duplication, and off-the-air recording for use outside the
home.4 '
The district court decision was like a shot heard around the world
of Disney, and beyond. For the first time, a court ruled that copying
for mere entertainment, convenience or increased access (rather
than criticism, news reporting, or scholarship) was fair use;42 that
36. Betamax1, 480 F. Supp. at 441-442. These plaintiffs sued Sony Corporation
(the Betamax manufacturer), Sony Corporation of America (U.S. Betamax distribu-
tor), certain retail stores that sold the Betamax, and the advertising agency, as di-
rect or contributory copyright infringers. In addition, the plaintiffs sued an
individual VCR user, William Griffiths, who used his Betamax VCR in his home to
copy plaintiffs' broadcast material for his private use. Id. at 432. Griffiths was a
client of the plaintiffs' law firm and consented to being a defendant in the suit;
although plaintiffs elicited testimony regarding his VCR use, they sought no relief
against him. BetamaxII, 464 U.S. at 422-23 nn.2-3; Betamax I, 480 F. Supp. at
437.
37. The Court's ultimate holding in the Betamax litigation turned on an equally
significant finding as to the burden for establishing contributory infringement. The
Court held that given some commercially significant non-infringing use, such as a
fair use, sales of devices could not support a holding of contributory infringement,
even though the other uses could be infringing. Betamar LI, 464 U.S. at 442, 456.
A discussion of the doctrine of contributory infringement is beyond the scope of
this Article. For an analysis of contributory infringement and digital audio record-
ers, see generally Seth D. Greenstein, Contributory Infringement, The Second Time
Around: The Copyright Case Against Digital Audio Tape Recorders, 3 J. PROPME-
TARu Rxorrs 2 (July 1991).
38. Betamax 1, 480 F. Supp. at 432.
39. Id. at 442, 456.
40. Id. at 450.
41. Id. at 442.
42. As to the "nature" of the material copied, the court declined to characterize
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copying of a whole work could qualify;4 3 and that it would be
"highly intrusive" and "practically impossible" to enforce copyright
prohibitions involving noncommercial copying in the home.44 Per-
haps most significantly, the decision suggested that the copyright
holder must prove economic harm to prove copyright infringement.
Although plaintiffs complained that their profits from televised
works would decrease if VCR use was not enjoined, the district court
found that the plaintiffs' prediction of harm was speculative, based
on a series of assumptions in a rapidly changing market.4' The
court noted that Hollywood has "proven resilient to change in mar-
ket practices arising from other technological inventions, e.g., cable
television, [and] pay television." 46 Moreover, copyright law "does
not protect authors from change or new considerations in the mar-
keting of their products."47 Quoting the Supreme Court from an
earlier copyright infringement case, the trial court added: "'While
securing compensation to the holders of copyright was an essential
purpose of that Act, freezing existing economic arrangements for
doing so was not.' ",48
B. Betamax's Second Run: The Appellate Court Decision
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals completely reversed the trial
court, holding that off-the-air home videotaping constitutes an in-
fringement of copyrighted audiovisual materials.49 In a restrictive
reading of the fair use doctrine, the Ninth Circuit stated that fair use
traditionally sanctions only "productive use" of copyrighted
works-not mere reproduction for "convenience," "entertainment,"
the subject television programs, such as the "New Mickey Mouse Club," as either
"educational," "informational," or "mere entertainment." Id. at 452. Rather, the
court found that the most important aspect of the "nature" of the televised works
was that the copyright owners voluntarily chose to telecast the programs over the
air, free of charge to the public. Id. at 453; see also infra note 44 and accompany-
ing text.
43. As to the "substantiality" of the use, the court found that the home copying
usually involves copying the entire work. Yet the court concluded: "This fact, how-
ever, does not defeat the defense of fair use, because all factors must be taken
together." Betamax , 480 F. Supp. at 454.
44. Considering the "purpose" of the allegedly infringing use, the court found
that the salient characteristics were that the copying was noncommercial and in the
home. Id. at 453-54. In'addition, the copying would increase access to broadcast
material. Id. at 454.
45. Id. at 450-52; see also id. at 467 ("Harm from time-shifting is speculative
and, at best, mini-al.").
46. Id. at 452.
47. Id.
48. Betamax 1,480 F. Supp. at 452 (quoting Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 414
n.150).
49. BetamaxI, 659 F.2d at 969.
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or "increased access."s °
Moreover, the appellate court set forth a less stringent standard
for proving actual or potential harm, citing the following test with
approval: " '[he central question in the determination of fair use is
whether the infringing work tends to diminish or prejudice the po-
tential sale of plaintiff's work.' ",51 The appellate court criticized the
lower court for not paying "sufficient attention to the cumulative ef-
fect of mass reproduction of copyrighted works" made possible by
VCRs which, in turn, would tend to diminish the potential market for
the copyrighted works.S2
C. The Supreme Court Decision: Betamax I Re-Released
After hearing, and rehearing, the Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals with a five-to-four majority, holding that private,
noncommercial home time-shifting-even if unauthorized-is legiti-
mate fair use."3 The Court completely rejected the court of appeals'
"two-dimensional" categorical requirement for "productive use."5 4
Significantly, the Court required a showing of a "meaningful likeli-
hood" of future harm to prove that noncommercial use is
infringing.55
50. 659 F.2d at 970-72 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107; LEON SEurzE, ExMu-vozs AND
FAI USE M CoPyom(r 24 (1978); Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.:
'Fair Use' Looks DiHerent on Videotape, 66 VA. L. l1Ev. 1005, 1012-14 (1980)).
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the four statutory factors for fair use went as fol-
lows. First, as for "purpose and character of use," the Ninth Circuit quoted the
lower court, noting that "'[c]ourts have traditionally applied this factor by asking
whether the copyrighted material is used for criticism, research or other independ-
ent work."' Betamax i, 659 F.2d at 972 (quoting Betamax I, 480 F. Supp. at 453).
The Ninth Circuit added that section 107 contrasts commercial use with non-profit
educational purposes, and stated that "copying of entertainment works for conven-
ience does not fall within the latter category." Id. Second, turning to the "nature"
of the copyrighted work, the appellate court stated that works that are more appro-
priately characterized as "creative" or "entertainment" are less likely to support a
claim of fair use than "informational type" works. Id. at 972. Thdrd, the appellate
court found that the "amount and substantiality" of copyrighted works used in
home videotaping (usually the entire work) clearly weighed against a finding of fair
use. According to the Ninth Circuit, excessive copying precludes fair use, regard-
less of any market affect. Id. at 973. Fourth, the court of appeals disagreed with
the lower court's treatment of the "harm" factor, stating that the trial court was
"much too strict" in requiring plaintiffs to prove actual or future harm. Id. at 973.
51. Id. at 974 (citing Nnaxn, § 13.05E][4][c], at 13-84 (1981)).
52. Id. at 974.
53. Betamax W, 464 U.S. at 442. The Court defined "time-shifting" as "the
practice of recording a program to view it once at a later time, and thereafter eras-
ing it." Id. at 423. The Court further explained: "Time-shifting enables viewers to
see programs they otherwise would miss because they are not at home, are occu-
pied with other tasks, or are viewing a program on another station at the time of a
broadcast that they desire to watch." Id.
54. Id. at 455 n.40.
55. Id. at 451.
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In its fair use analysis, the Supreme Court found that time-shifting
for private home use, a noncommercial, nonprofit activity, is pre-
sumptively fair. 6 Given the nature of televised programming, the
Court noted that "time-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such
a work which he had been invited to witness in its entirety free of
charge, [therefore] the fact that the entire work is reproduced...
does not have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair
use."
57
The Court also considered the "harm" factor, the "effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work."5 8' The majority opinion set forth the following test for deter-
mining potential harm from noncommercial uses of copyrighted
works:
A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work re-
quires proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it
should become widespread, it would adversely affect the poten-
tial market for the copyrighted work. Actual present harm need
not be shown; such a requirement would leave the copyright
holder with no defense against predictable damage. Nor is it nec-
essary to show with certainty that future harm will result. What is
necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists. If the intended
use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed. But
if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be
demonstrated.5 9
Noting respondents' admission that no actual harm had occurred
to date, as well as the trial court's finding that no likelihood of future
harm was shown at trial,"0 the Court concluded that "respondents
failed to demonstrate that time-shifting would cause any likelihood
of non-minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of,
their copyrighted works."8 1
56. Id. at 449.
57. Betamaxz I, 464 U.S. at 449-50.
58. Id. at 450.
59. Id. at 451 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 452-54.
61. Betamax HI, 464 U.S. at 456. The dissenting opinion took issue with the
finding that the 1976 Copyright Act contains "an implied exemption for 'home-use
recording,"' and concluded that time.shifting cannot be deemed a "fair use." Id.
at 470, 475, 486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J., Powell, J., and
Rehnquist, J.). This conclusion rested largely on a lesser standard for proving harm,
to wit: "[Wihen the proposed use is an unproductive one, a copyright owner need
prove only a potenftal for harm to the market for or the value of the copyrighted
work." Id. at 482 (citing Nnvmmw, § 13.05[E][4][c], at 13-84 (1981)). Under this
standard, the dissent found that the plaintiffs demonstrated that they had been de-
prived of the ability to exploit the sizable potential market that VCR technology
created for their copyrighted programs, and that time-shifting has a substantial ad-
verse effect upon this potential market. Id. at 485-86.
1992]
82 Entertainment, Media & Intellectual Property Law Forum [Vol. 2
III. DOCTRINE OF FAIR USE: THE SEQUEL
No subsequent cases have turned on the home taping aspects of
Betamax 11. A year later, however, the Supreme Court embellished
its analysis of the doctrine of fair use. In Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,2 the Court reexamined the four fair use
factors set forth in section 107. Although that case involved unau-
thorized publication of quotations in The Nation Magazine ("The Na-
tion") from a soon-to-be published manuscript, the Court's analysis
sheds light on application of the fair use doctrine generally.
1. Purpose and Character of the Use
In Harper & Row, the Court interpreted the first fair use factor as
follows: "The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether
the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user
stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without
paying the customary price." 3 In addition, the Court, for the first
time, explicitly. stated that standards of generally acceptable public
behavior should be considered in analyzing the character and pur-
pose of the use.6 4 According to the Court, "[flair use presupposes
'good faith' and 'fair dealing.' ,,6S
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
As to the second fair use factor, the Court emphasized that the
62. 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding, by a vote of six to three, that the unauthorized
use of quotations from a former president's as yet unpublished manuscript consti-
tuted copyright infringement and not a fair use sanctioned by section 107).
63. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562. Although seemingly clear and objective,
this interpretation of the "commercial" factor contrasts markedly with those offered
in Betamax I1. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Betamax I7, equated
"commercial" with money-making (as opposed to "nonprofit"). Justice Blackmun,
in dissent, looked to the user's motivation, contrasting commercial activities with
activities motivated by a "humanitarian impulse." Justice O'Connor's definition for
the majority opinion in Harper & Row adds a third, yet no less problematic, twist to
this factor, as she looks not to motive or monetary gain, but to whether the user pays
the "customary price"-which is undefined. See generally William W. Fisher III,
Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HAv. L. Rzv. 1661, 1673-74 & nn.63-67
(1988) (discussing the three readings of the commercial/noncommercial
distinction).
64. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 ("Also relevant to the 'character' of the use
is 'the propriety of the defendant's conduct.'" (quoting NumER, § 13.05[A], at 13-
72 (1981))). For a discussion of the difficulty in relying on such "popular morality,"
see Fisher, supra note 63, at 1678-82.
65. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (quoting Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs.,
293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)); see also id. at 563 ("Fair use distinguishes
between 'a true scholar and a chiseler who infringes a work for personal profit.' ")
(quoting Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d .91, 94 (2d
Cir. 1977) (quoting Hearings on Bills for the General Revision of the Copyright
Law Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1706
(1966) (statement of John Schulman)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978)).
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copyrighted work had not yet been published. The Court explained
that "the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished
works," and that the "author's right to control the first public ap-
pearance of his expression weighs against... [the] use of the work
before its release."16 6 In essence, the Harper & Row Court, like the
Betamax HI Court, considered whether (and how) the copyrighted
work had been disseminated to the unauthorized user as a critical
factor in the fair use analysis.
The Court also considered the "fact vs. fiction" distinction, stating
that "[t]he law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate
factual works than works of fiction or fantasy." 67 Accordingly, it
would follow that unauthorized users of copyrighted 'entertainment-
.oriented" works would have a greater burden to establish fair use
than unauthorized users of informational works.
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
Regarding the amount of the copyrighted work used, the Harper
& Row Court noted that the quotations copied in that case, (verbatim
copying of 300 words out of approximately 200,000 words), were
an insubstantial portion of the copyrighted work in strict quantitative
terms.68 Yet in qualitative terms, the Court found that the portions
quoted were "essentially the heart of the book."' 69 The Court fur-
ther found that the quotations constituted a substantial and key por-
tion of Te Nation's article, and "serve as its dramatic focal
points."7 This emphasis on the derivative work in essence looks to
whether the second work is a "productive" one or merely exploits
the most valuable portions of the original work, a consideration the
Betamax I majority and the dissenting opinion in Harper & Row
eschewed (emphasizing instead the adverse consequences of the
copying).7 1
66. Id. at 564.
67. Id. at 563. The Court characterized the copyrighted work at issue in Harper
& Row as an unpublished historical narrative or autobiography, i.e., a factual work.
The Court then proceeded to analyze whether the quotations used in the derivative
work were necessary to convey the facts adequately, or were more subjective or
expressive elements of the copyrighted work. Id. at 563-64.
68. Id. at 564.
69. Id. at 564-65 (quoting with approval the trial court's finding, 557 F. Supp.
1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
70. Id. at 565-66. Oddly, the Court examined the amount and substantiality of
the copyrighted work used in relation to the second derivative work as whole, even
though section 107 points to "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the [original] copyrighted work as a whole." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (3).
71. Cf. Betamax IU, 464 U.S. at 449-50, 455 n.40; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
599 n.23 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by White, J., and Marshall, J.) ("As the
statutory directive implies, it matters little whether the second author's use is 1- or
100-percent appropriated expression if the taking of that expression had no ad-
verse effect on the copyrighted work.").
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4. Effect on the Potential Market or Value
The Court stated that "[tihis last factor is undoubtedly the single
most important element of fair use.""2 The Court explained that fair
use is limited to copying that does not "materially impair" the poten-
tial market for or value of the copied work. 3 The Court further
noted that some economists believe that fair use should be permitted
only where "the market fails or the price the copyright holder would
ask is near zero."74 Under this view, fair use should not be allowed
where it would disrupt normal channels of distribution of the copy-
righted work.75
The Court reiterated that "to negate fair use one need only show
that if, the challenged use 'should become widespread, it would ad-
versely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.' "76
This inquiry also includes consideration of harm to the value of any
rights in the copyrighted work, such as adaptation or serialization
rights.77 In general, "'a use that supplants any part of the normal
market for a copyrighted work would ordinarily be considered an
infringement.' "78 Conversely, it would follow that a use that does
not supplant the normal market for the copyrighted work nor materi-
72. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. The dissent agreed. Id. at 602.
73. Id. at 566-67 (quoting Nnmin.n, § 1.10[)], at 1-87 (1981)).
74. Id. at 566 n.9; cf. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Struc-
tural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Co,.trm.
L. REv. 1600, 1601 (1982) (proposing a market approach to fair use, and sug-
gesting that unauthorized use of copyrighted works should be considered fair
"[w]here (1) defendant could not appropriately purchase the desired use through
the market; (2) transferring control over the use to defendant would serve the pub-
lic interest; and (3) the copyright owner's incentives would not be substantially im-
paired by allowing the user to proceed") (footnotes omitted). But see Fisher, supra
note 63, at 1671 (noting that "fair" use will impair the marketability of the copy-
righted work in all but the rare cases in which the user would be unwilling to pay
the copyright holder anything).
75. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 n.9
76. Id. at 568 (quoting Betamax IZI, 464 U.S. at 451; id. at 484 & n.36 (dissent-
ing opinion)). One commentator states that by citing the passages in the Betamax
III dissenting opinion that expansively define "potential market," the Harper & Row
Court quietly adopted a definition that would nearly always favor the copyright
holder, because there will nearly always be some material adverse impact on a
"potential market." Fisher, supra note 63, at 1671 & n.53. This reading is trouble-
some; although there may nearly always be some adverse impact on a "potential
market," it is quite another thing to suggest that there will nearly always be some
material adverse impact. As that author later states, "a court confronted with a fair
use defense must estimate the magnitude of the market impairment caused by
privileging the defendant's conduct; merely ascertaining the existence of adverse
impact will not suffice." Id. at 1672.
77. 471 U.S. at 568 (quoting NunaERi, § 13.O5[B], at 13-77 to 78 (1981)). Justice
Brennan agreed in his dissent. Id. at 602. The dissenting opinion, however, criti-
cized the majority's "exceedingly narrow definition" and "constricted reading of
the fair use doctrine." Id. at 579.
78. Id. at 568 (quoting S. RE. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1975)).
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ally impact the marketability of derivative rights in the copyrighted
work may be a fair use.
IV. DOCTRINE OF FAIR USE: A CRITICAL REVIEW
From early on, the doctrine of fair use was called "the most troub-
lesome in the whole law of copyright."79 Betamax ll and Harper &
Row reflect the difficulty of forcing the flexible fair use doctrine into
a solid framework. In each case, the trial court was reversed by the
appellate court, which was reversed by a closely divided Supreme
Court. It is therefore difficult to predict the outcome of a fair use
analysis in a different context, especially where the uncertainties re-
garding a new technology are involved.
In an attempt to draw some generalities, one commentator sug-
gests that a close reading of the majority opinions in Betamax III
and Harper & Row reveal a set of questions the Court deemed
relevant:
(1) Did the infringement have a material impact on the "potential
market" for the copyrighted work? (2) Was the use "commercial"
or "noncommercial"? (3) Had the copyrighted work been pub-
lished at the time of copying? (4) How much--quantitatively and
qualitatively-of the putatively infringing work was drawn from
the copyrighted work? (5) Was the unauthorized use consistent
with customary standards of propriety?"'
Another legal scholar emphasizes an obvious, yet easily over-
looked, consideration for fair use: fairness.8 1 As the Betamax HI
and Harper & Row opinions demonstrate, a strict utilitarian or eco-
nomic analysis based on four ill-defined statutory factors is not al-
ways sufficient to deal (fairly) with a tough case. Sometimes,
79. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per
curiam).
80. Fisher, supra note 63, at 1668. This author further suggests that the Court's
majority opinions in Betamax and Harper & Row reveal three secondary considera-
tions: (1) the fact versus fiction distinction; (2) the necessity of the copying to the
defendant's goal; and (3) the "productivity" of the secondary work (a factor mini-
mized by both majority opinions, but considered significant in the dissents). Id. at
1682-86.
This commentator states that the Court's opinions reveal four objectives that
should be served by copyright law in general and the fair use doctrine in
particular:
(a) advancing social utility by increasing the supply of intellectual prod-
ucts and facilitating their distribution; (b) enforcing an author's natural
right to a reasonable portion of the fruits of his labor; (c) protecting an
author's interest in controlling the way in which his creations are
presented to the world; and (d) aligning the law with custom and popular
conceptions of decent behavior.
Id. at 1668-69, 1687-92.
81. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103
HAuv. L. REv. 1137, 1150 (1990).
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especially where new technology or novel copyright issues are in-
volved, society's broader considerations of fairness transcend the
statutory factors:
... lit makes a difference whether a user obtained his copy of the
original work lawfully or by theft, and if lawfully, by a means that
is entirely proper or in some manner underhanded. It makes a
difference whether a copyright owner's reason for refusing to give
a license for the use is one that the community generally ap-
proves, copyright issues aside, or is one that it allows but disap-
proves. The community's understanding of and attitude toward a
practice that directly implicates considerations of copyright may
nevertheless transcend that aspect of the matter and dictate a con-
trary conclusion. That may occur, for example, when a new tech-
nology is introduced for which the closest analogies within the
area of copyright are inapt, because of an overwhelming differ-
ence of scale or scope that transforms the place of the practice in
everyday life.
8 2
In short, when analyzing whether a certain activity falls within the
fair use privilege, one must be sure not to become so intertwined
with assessing the four statutory factors that consideration of the
"fairness" of the activity in question is overlooked.
V. SO WHAT ABOUT COPYING FROM CABLE & PAY
TELEVISION?
A. Home Taping Should Be Considered Fair Use
.Back to our scenario. A would-be home taper has lawfully ac-
quired (and paid for) cable and pay television service to his or her
home."3 The potential home taper is contemplating recording from
the pay television signals for private, noncommercial use; the sub-
scriber simply wants to view the program at a later time.84 The
82. Id. at 1152-53; see also New Era Publications Int'l v. Carol Publishing
Group, 904 F.2d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that courts look to additional
considerations that may suggest unfairness, such as the unauthorized user's bad
faith (citing Maxtone-Gralam v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1264 (2d Cir. 1986)).
83. Federal and state laws protect against the unauthorized receipt of cable and
subscription television services. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779, 2796-97 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553 (1984)),
created both criminal penalties and a private right of action and civil damages for
theft of cable services. Similarly, the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3949, 3959-60 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1988)), stiff-
ened criminal and civil penalties to enhance remedies against piracy of satellite-
delivered video programming. Anti-theft telecommunications laws have also been
enacted by the majority of states. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL Cons § 593e (West 1991);
TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 31.12 (West 1991) (Unauthorized Use of Television Decod-
ing and Interception Device or Cable Descrambling, Decoding, or Interception De-
vice); N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-118.5 (1990) (Theft of Cable Television Services); see
also Leibowitz, supra note 6, at 688 n.87 (citing state statutes).
84. The fair use analysis in this Article is limited to home recording from pay
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home taper has no intent to sell the home-made recording, no intent
to "library" the home-made video permanently, s and no intent to
duplicate the home-recorded copy (to make a "second generation"
or "serial" copy).86
television for "time-shifting" purposes-the most prevalent home taping activity. In
a 1988 survey of home tapers, the majority (62%) of individuals who record video
programming from broadcast or cable television reported that their most recent
videotape was made for temporary use only. OFFICE or TECHNOLOOY AssEssENr,
U.S. CONGRESS, CoPYmRIHT Nmm Homz Copymo: TscmoooY CHmmomS Tm LAW 161
(1989) [hereinafter OTA SuRvEY].
85. "Librarying," the practice of recording television programs to keep indefi-
nitely (rather than for temporary use) is not as common as time-shift recording. Ap-
proximately one-third (35%) of survey respondents reported that the most recent
tape they recorded from television was made to keep. OTA SuRvEY, supra note 84,
at 287 (Tbl. 12-10). The total number of videotapes that a VCR household owns is
also telling: 42% of VCR owners report having fewer than 10 videotapes; 28%
report having between 11 and 25 videotapes; 16% have between 26 and 50 tapes.
Only 7% of VCR households claim to have more than 50 videotapes. JoN M.
BoYz, PH.D., KmmN-T E. JoN & Jiwx A. Wsmznnm, A SupptniENrARy REPORT ON
HOEr, VmEocAssErTE CoPrYNo AND RECORINo 9 (1988) (report submitted to the Office
of Technology Assessment by Schulman, Ronca & Bucavalas, Inc.) [hereinafter
OTA SuppumwITAL REPORT]. The total number of videotapes reported above in-
cludes blank tapes, prerecorded tapes, tapes recorded from home video cameras,
as well as tapes recorded from television. Id. at 8-9. Thus, the great majority of
home recorders have only a minimal number of videotapes recorded from televi-
sion in their video "libraries."
Witness testimony and survey evidence introduced in the Betamax I trial similarly
shows that the expense, in terms of purchasing blank tapes, and the time needed to
record and then watch the recorded programs, limits the size of "libraries" of
home-made tapes of television programs. Betamax I, 480 F. Supp. at 436, 438-49.
86. Copying of home-made or prerecorded videos is not very widespread.
Copying a videocassette requires a second VCR, yet the vast majority of house-
holds with both a VCR and cable (79%) own but a single VCR. Sweeting, supra
note 12, at 51, 57; OTA Supp i m wrT, REPORT, supra note 85, at 6. Even if a house-
hold has two or more VCRs, they are not necessarily of the same format. Id. at 3, 7.
One analysis states that "[t]he nature of the technology makes it more difficult and
inconvenient for the consumer to copy videotapes [than audio formats]. The limited
penetration of multiple VCRs in households suggests that relatively few households
are willing to buy the technology to copy videotapes conveniently." Id. at 3.
In the 1988 OTA Survey, only one in five respondents who had acquired a video-
tape in the past year reported ever having copied a video, either prerecorded or
home recorded. OTA SutvEy, supra note 84, at 162. When considering only re-
spondents who were over 17 years old and have a VCR in their household (or had
owned, borrowed, or rented a VCR in the last year), only 14% of this population
reported ever having copied a videotape. OTA SuPLEmrrAL REPORT, supra note
85, at 16. Only one in 10 VCR owners reported having copied a videotape in the
past year; fewer than one in 20 (3%) copied a videotape in the past month. OTA
SuRvEy, supra note 84, at 162; OTA SuppeENTAL REPORT, supra note 85, at 18.
Tape copies (either from a prerecorded videotape or a television recording) ac-
counted for only 2% of the most recently acquired video tapes; in comparison, re-
spondents purchased 23% of their most recently acquired videotapes and recorded
54% from television. OTA SURVEY, supra note 84, at 162; OTA SuPPLmNTAL RE-
Pour, supra note 85, at 13.
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This Article asserts that home video recording for time-shifting
purposes is a legitimate fair use of copyrighted television program-
ming that is lawfully acquired via pay television services (as well as
free over-the-air broadcasts).
1. The Four Statutory Fair Use Factors
(a) Purpose and Character of the Use
Analyzed in light of the commercial/noncommercial distinction,
home taping from pay television, like home taping from broadcast
television, should be characterized as private and noncommercial
when it is conducted in the home, for private use. Under Justice
Stevens' analysis in Betamax II, wherein he equates "commercial"
with "profitmaking" (as opposed to "noncommercial, nonprofit"), 7
the home recorder would not realize any direct profit or cost savings
from the home recording. In fact, each recording episode would
result in additional costs, both monetary (cost of the recording
equipment and blank media) and "opportunity" cost (i.e., time and
effort to plan the recording session, and purchase blank tapes).88
Similarly, under the Harper & Row profit/nonprofit distinction, the
home taper does not "[stand] to profit from exploitation of the copy-
righted material without paying the customary price."8 9 The home
taper does not profit from nor "exploit" the recorded work at all, but
merely watches the home-recorded program in the home at a differ-
ent time from its scheduled dissemination. Moreover, assuming that
the home taper is a paying subscriber and is authorized to receive
the pay television signal, he or she has already paid the customary
price for the program.
Home taping would also probably be considered consistent with
customary standards of propriety. VCR use has penetrated most
households in the last decade.9 0 As a consequence, home record-
ing of broadcast and cable television has become widespread 91
and, presumably, relatively non-controversial. 92 There is no evi-
87. Cf. Betamax M, 464 U.S. at 449; see also supra note 63.
88. Cf. John Cirace, When Does Complete Copying of Copyrighted Works for
Purposes Other Than for Profit or Sale Constitute Fair Use? An Economic Analysis
of the Sony Betamax and Williams & Wilkins Cases, 28 ST. Lours U. L.J. 647, 661-
62 (1984).
89. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
90. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
91. OTA SunvEy, supra note 84, at 161 (citing a survey that found that 59% of
VCR owners reported recording one or more programs from broadcast or cable
television in the past month); Sweeting, supra note 12, at 51 (citing a 1989 con-
sumer survey that found that nearly 61% of households that subscribe to cable TV
and own a VCR record programs from cable; 50% of such households record from
PPV).
92. See OFFICE OF TzcHwoAOOY AssEssMENr, U.S. CoNoRESS, INTm, cTuAL PROPERTY
RIHrs IN AN AGE OF ExcrRomcs AND INFoRM AmON 208-09 (1986) [hereinafter OTA
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dence that the increasing availability of pay television services has
had any affect on the scale or scope of home video recording so as
to alter this general public practice and acceptance.
(b) Nature of the Copyrighted Work
As to the nature of pay television programming, consider first that
the copyright owner has voluntarily disseminated the television
work to the public, and the home viewer has lawfully acquired the
right to view the programming. Indeed, copyright owners license
their works-for a fee-for dissemination via pay television distribu-
tion. The subscriber, in turn, pays for the right to receive the pro-
gramming. Home recording of pay television programming for
time-shifting purposes is, in effect, a means of "receiving" the paid-
for programming--an alternative to contemporaneous viewing.93
Thus, the case for permitting home viewers to record from cable and
pay television services is arguably even stronger than for allowing
home recording from conventional broadcast television.
Consumers do not directly pay for broadcast television program-
ming. Advertisers pay, based on the size of the television audience,
to air their commercials; and consumers indirectly pay for this ad-
vertising through increased costs for advertised products and serv-
ices. In contrast, cable and pay television subscribers pay directly
to receive programming. Although the subscriber's payments are
made to the pay television distributor (not the copyright holder), that
distributor, in turn, pays licensing fees to the copyright holders.94
Izmn!EcuAL PROPERTY REPORT] (citing an OTA survey finding that the vast majority
of the public (over 7 in 10) believes that copying from one's own television for
noncommercial use is acceptable behavior); see also OTA SuRvEY, supra note 84 at
163-64 n.82 (finding that the general public consensus considered home taping
from audio formats acceptable behavior, except for home taping to sell).
93. Taking this argument one step further, some legal scholars have suggested
that home copying for private use, including home audio or video recording,
should not be considered a "reproduction" subject to the exclusive right to make
and to authorize copies set forth in section 106 of the Copyright Act. See 17
U.S.C.A. § 106(1) (West 1977). Rather, the right to reproduce "may well mean
only the right again to produce, which is to say to communicate publicly. No kind
of ordinary home copying for private use is in that sense a reproduction." Hearings
on Copyright and Technological. Change Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Adminisfration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 71-72 (1983) (statement of David Lange, Professor of Law,
Duke University) [hereinafter Lange Statement]. Under this view, a fair use analy-
sis need not even come into play, because home copying for private use would not
infringe the reproduction right, nor any other exclusive rights in section 106.
94. Premium cable networks such as HBO, Cinemax, and ESPN pay license fees
to copyright holders to air copyrighted programs and movies. In turn, resale satel-
lite carriers and cable operators generally pay license fees to carry these cable
networks. See Paul Farhi, Broadcast TV Helped Secure Rival Cable's Position in
Marketplace, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1992, at A14.
Cable systems and satellite carriers do not pay royalty fees for local retransmis-
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In the case of pay television services, copyright proprietors
should have no greater right to control consumers' ability to record
in their homes for use in their homes than in the context of free over-
the-air broadcasts; a heavy burden should be required to overcome
this presumption.9" The argument for separate compensation for
VCR viewing and recording essentially is not so much that such
price discrimination is necessary, but that it is now technically
possible.
Technological developments and new methods of signal encryp-
tion offer to satellite and cable operators the means to establish and
maintain control over copying access to pay television program-
ming. It is foreseeable that pay television distributors might want to
withhold the ability to record unless the subscriber pays a special
"copying" fee in addition to the basic subscription fee. This type of
price discrimination, where programming is offered at one price for
viewing only and at a higher price for copying, is objectionable on
several grounds.
The copying surcharge is analogous to a royalty payment for the
right to record the subject television program for private noncom-
mercial use. Using economic analytic models, legal scholars previ-
ously have asserted that such price discrimination may
overcompensate copyright proprietors for any harm suffered from
noncommercial home video recording and may overstimulate pro-
duction of their works.9" Copyright owners therefore should pursue
other marketing alternatives that would cause less distortion to in-
come distribution and resource allocation.9 7
If technological means are used to control the subscriber's ability
to copy, conforming hardware (i.e., television sets, VCRs, and re-
lated devices) would be required to implement the controlled ac-
cess or total anti-copy system. Such controlled-copy systems could
be subverted by incompatibility of existing hardware or technologi-
cal adaptations by electronics manufacturers. Although such tech-
sion of broadcast stations that subscribers can receive over-the-air. See 17
U.S.C.A. § 11 1(d)(1)(B), § 119(a)(2)(B) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). Yet cable oper-
ators do make royalty payments for the secondary transmission of distant non-net-
work programming; under the cable compulsory licensing scheme, royalty
payments are based on the gross receipts from cable system subscribers. Id. Simi-
larly, satellite carriers are subject to statutory licensing for secondary transmission
to private home viewers of "superstations" and network stations that the household
cannot receive over-the-air. 17 U.S.C.A. § 119(a)(1)-(2). License fees are calcu-
lated based on the number of home satellite subscribers. 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 119(b)(1)(B). A "superstation" is a non-network television broadcast station that
is retransmitted by satellite. 17 U.S.C.A. § 119(d)(9)). These statutory licensing
schemes are an ongoing topic of legislative debate.
95. See discussion regarding the requisite showing of harm, infra notes 107-110
and accompanying text.
96. Cirace, supra note 88, at 678-81.
97. Id. at 681.
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nological maneuverings could be prohibited by law, statutory
restrictions could have the unwanted consequence of freezing tech-
nological development. The legal uncertainty created by a vague
right to price discrimination and to control copying could severely
slow the pace at which new products are offered in the
marketplace. 98
Pay television systems that would automatically and indiscrimi-
nately prevent or add a surcharge for home recording also would be
inconsistent with existing copyright law absent any provision for
non-infringing copying, such as fair use copying for scholarly, edu-
cational, and other purposes, copying of works in the public do-
main, and even copying where the copyright holder has no
objection to home recording. 9 Distributors of pay television pro-
gramming should not have the right to prevent or control copying
unless that control is strictly limited to known infringing uses.100
The nature of pay television as a medium offers a wealth and diver-
sity of programming previously unavailable. This suggests that the
potential for noninfringing copying likewise increases
exponentially.
As for the secondary "fact vs. fiction" factor regarding the nature
of the copyrighted work, this consideration is not especially enlight-
ening. As in Betamax I, the line between dissemination of scholarly
information and mere entertainment is not always bright.10 1 In the
current age of "docudramas" and the like, factual stories are often
fictionalized, and fiction is often based on fact.10 2 Moreover, pay
television subscribers may record television programs that are indis-
putably "factual" in nature, such as news and current affairs pro-
grams, sporting events and, more recently, highly publicized court
and legislative proceedings.1
98. See discussion of the Motion Picture Anti-Piracy Act, infra notes 114-120
and accompanying text.
99. See OTA firnuaMcTUAL PROPEzrY REPORT, supra note 92, at 119-20 (stating
that "technological protection may Be a poor way to protect intellectual property
rights because it ignores part of the constitutional compromise between the public
welfare and the profit-making of intellectual creators").
100. Cf. BefamaxJfl, 464 U.S. at 442 (stating that the sale of copying equipment
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product can be used for legiti-
mate, noninfringing purposes).
101. See Betamax I, 480 F. Supp. at 452-53; see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 566 (1969) (stating, in First Amendment case, that "[t]he line between the
transmission of ideas and mere entertainment is much too elusive for this Court to
draw, if indeed such a line can be drawn at all").
102. Compare popular television series such as "America's Most Wanted," where
actual crimes are re-enacted, with the television series "L.A. Law," where the sup-
posedly fictional legal controversies are frequently based on actual cases.
103. In a 1988 survey, home tapers were asked to reveal the type of program
they recorded in their most recent recording session from television. One quarter
of the respondents had recorded "factual" programming: 16% of the respondents
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(c) Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
As with conventional broadcast television, presumably individu-
als recording from pay television services would record the entire
program. There has long been disagreement among the courts
about whether complete copying can be considered fair use.1"'
The Betamax I Court, of course, allowed copying of an entire
copyrighted work from broadcast television. In any event, the un-
derlying question is whether the copying has any adverse effect on
the copyrighted work, as discussed below.1 0 5
(d) Effect on the Potential Market or Value
As the Supreme Court made clear, the single most important in-
quiry in connection with fair use is: Would the subject use matezi-
ally impair the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work? If home taping from pay television became widespread, is
there a meaningful likelihood that it would adversely affect the nor-
mal channels of distribution for the copyrighted works featured on
such services? For motion pictures and pay television program-
ming, this inquiry should account for potential harm to the initial
dissemination of the work, as well as harm to the market for future
distribution (such as repeat showings, syndication, and exploitation
of alternative markets like home video and broadcast television).1 0
The analysis of potential harm should properly focus on the mag-
nitude of any market impairment caused by privileging the home
taping; merely ascertaining the existence of some adverse impact
should not support a finding of copyright infringement. Proponents
of expanded copyright protections, especially those at odds with
well-established concepts, should bear a heavy burden of proof in
demonstrating the requisite harm to justify new limits on consumers'
noncommercial use of copyrighted works.10 7 Accordingly, if copy-
recorded sporting events in their most recent taping session; 4% recorded news
specials, documentaries, or current events programs; 3% recorded talk shows; and
another 2% recorded educational or science shows. OTA Supprmimrru. REPORT,
supra note 85, at t1l. 12-9.
104. Cirace, supra note 88, at 653-54 & nn.35-40 (citing conflicting court opin-
ions about whether the copying of an entire work can be fair use); see also New Era
Publications Int'l v. Carol Publishing Group, 904 F.2d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 1990)
(stating that: "'There are no absolute rules as to how much of a copyrighted work
may be copied and still be considered a fair use."' (quoting Maxtone-Graham v.
Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986))); Agreement on Guidelines for
Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational !nstitutions, H.R. REP. No. 1476,
supra note 23, at 68-70, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681-83 (copying
of complete poem, article, story, or essay may be fair use under certain
circumstances).
105. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 599 n.23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. See generally Leibowitz, supra note 6, at 694-95 (outlining several sequen-
tial levels of potential program distribution).
107. See Lange Statement, supra note 93, at 64-65; Robert W. Kastenmeier &
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right proprietors seek to circumscribe the Betamax I holding to the
specific facts of that case (over-the-air broadcasts) and to assert that
consumer home recording from pay television is copyright infringe-
ment (rather than fair use), they have a tremendous burden of show-
ing that potential harm from noncommercial recording from pay
television services cbmpels enhanced copyright protection.1 0 8
As a general matter, the extent of harm from complete copying for
purposes other than profit or sale is extremely difficult to assess.10 9
This difficulty in assessing "harm" is exacerbated in cases where
new technology is involved, with no proven track record to ex-
Michael J. Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp
or Finn Ground?, 70 Mnm. L. Izv. 417, 438-42 (1985); see also Betama 117, 464
U.S. at 449-451 (noting that there is a presumption that nonprofit, noncommercial
use is fair use, and that a meaningful likelihood of future harm must be demon-
strated to overcome this presumption); Peter Jaszi, The Case Against Performance
Bights in Sound Recordings 3-4, 20 (1990) (unpublished manuscript submitted in
response to Notice of Inquiry in Docket No. RM 90-6, Copyright Office Study of
Digital Audio Broadcast and Cable Services) ("Proponents of [new copyright inter-
ests] must do more than show that they would benefit from the imposition of new
restrictions; they must demonstrate that those restrictions would not unnecessarily
disrupt settled economic and cultural arrangements built on the foundation of
vested expectations.").
Former Congressman Kastenmeier and Mr. Remington, former Chief Counsel of
the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and
the Administration of Justice, set forth a four-pronged test for those who propose
change to the intellectual property landscape. Kastenmeier & Remington, supra, at
438-42. First, the proponent of a new protectable interest must show that the inter-
est is in harmony with the existing legal framework. Id. at 440-41. Second, the
proponent must be able to define the new interest in clear and satisfactory terms.
Id. at 441. Third, the proponent should present an "honest" cost-benefit analysis of
the proposed change. Id. Finally, any advocate of a new protectable interest
should demonstrate how giving protection to that interest will enrich or enhance
the aggregate public domain. Id. at 441-42.
This four-pronged analysis was developed in the context of a legislative proposal
to extend a new form of intellectual property protection to semiconductor chips;
nevertheless, this analytical framework is equally applicable to any analysis of ex-
tending intellectual property protections to any new technologies. Ultimately, de-
cisions to expand the scope of copyright protections are soundly made only when
all relevant interest groups have negotiated to compromise their differences and
presented the agreed upon results in the form of legislative proposals. Jaszi, supra,
at 9-11, and citations therein. This method assures that the overall copyright bal-
ance accommodates the interests of copyright owners, copyright users, and institu-
tional interest groups. See general/y Lange Statement, supra note 93, at 66-68
(posing several hurdles a proponent of a new copyright interest must overcome to
rebut the presumption against recognizing new copyright interests).
108. In this connection, Professor Lange remarked that economic interests may
have developed in reliance on established copyright concepts, thus proponents of
change must demonstrate both why they are entitled to such change and why others
who may have benefited by existing law should bear the burden of that change.
Lange Statement, supra note 93, at 67, 74.
109. Cirace~supra note 88, at 654.
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amine.110 Nevertheless, over the years certain patterns in response
to new technologies have emerged.
As the Betamax X Court found, the movie and television industry
has proven strikingly resilient to new technologies and new con-
sumer viewing habits. Although Hollywood initially scorned the ad-
vent of the VCR, this consumer device has proven to be a big boon
to the entertainment industry. Indeed, the VCR revolution has sig-
nificantly enhanced the value of motion picture production. In addi-
tion to increasing access to broadcast programming, the VCR
spawned a totally new market for "home video"--the sale and rental
of prerecorded videocassettes.
Although the use of VCRs and the practice of home recording for
time-shifting purposes has become widespread, cable and pay tele-
vision services have proliferated. The potential market for and
value of copyrighted movies and television programming continues
to increase with these expanded markets and services. There is no
evidence that subscribers' ability to record from pay television does
or will present a meaningful likelihood of harm to the market for
copyrighted pay television programming.111 On the contrary, the
ability to record from pay television increases the utility, conven-
ience, and value of the pay television services to consumers. Home
video recording does not distrupt the normal channels of distribu-
tion, it enhances them. Consequently, more consumers probably
subscribe to such services, and perhaps even pay more to subscribe.
The ability to record from pay television thus arguably increases the
market for copyrighted works, ultimately enhancing compensation
to copyright owners of the subject programs and movies. 112
Furthermore, analyses have shown that the cost (both monetary
and opportunity) of individual copying for private use effectively
110. OTA Iwrmu~cruA PRoPERTY REPoRT, supra note 92, at 197-201 (describing
the difficulties in assessing actual and potential harm to copyright proprietors
caused by private use, especially where claims of potential harm are based on an
alleged right to the new opportunities provided by technology). The OTA Iwrmc-
TuL PROPERTY REPORT concluded that "[tihe harm done to producers by private use
is ... indeterminate." Id. at 201. This report adds that an estimate of any harm
caused by private copying should include a consideration of the beneficial effects
of new technology to new and existing markets for intellectual property. For exam-
ple, the OTA Report notes that, "[a]lthough the videocassette recorder may give
rise to copying, it also permits the exploitation of markets that would otherwise not
exist. Both factors must be taken into account in considering harm." Id.
111. Id. at 101, 200-01 (finding that it is often impossible to answer definitively
whether a particular instance of consumer copying actually displaced either a sale
of a prerecorded copy or further exploitation of the copyrighted work).
112. Even if copyright interests could demonstrate that they could make greater
aggregate returns if they were remunerated for consumer home copying by means
of price discrimination, such a result does not, by itself, demonstrate the requisite
"harm" so as to justify the creation of additional intellectual property rights to
achieve this end. See id. at 187, 197-98; Lange Statement, supra note 93, at 67.
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limits the amount of such copying and the consequent harm to copy-
right owners.1I 3 Potential harm to the market or value of copy-
righted works from home recording is therefore inherently
circumscribed by the nature of home recording practices. There is
no meaningful likelihood that home recording will supplant the nor-
mal channels of initial or sequential distribution for copyrighted
movies and other television programs.
2. The Fairness Factor
In addition to the four statutory factors outlined above, considera-
tion of "fairness" dictates that time-shift recording should be consid-
ered fair use regardless of the method of transmission. Consider the
following:
0 Broadcast television stations are also transmitted by cable and
satellite services. Does a consumer engage in fair use when tap-
ing from broadcasts received over the air, but infringe copyrights
when taping the'same program carried on cable?
* Is a consumer who tapes a football game from broadcast tele-
vision a fair user, while the time-shifter recording from ESPN is an
infringer?
* Is a time-shift recording of Raiders of the Lost Ark fair use if
taped from a broadcast network but infringement if recorded from
HBO?
e Is it any less a fair use for a cable subscriber to tape a program
airing late at night for private viewing the next day?
0 What about consumers who work the night shift? Aren't they
fair users if they tape a pay-per-view event for viewing at their
convenience?
Put simply, whether video recording is a fair use should be deter-
mined primarily by the nature of the use and not the manner in
which the program is received. Once the copyright owner volunta-
rily elects to exploit commercially an audiovisual work through pay
television services, he or she should not be allowed to discriminate
among the means by which the consumer receives the program by
way of intellectual property sanction. Whether the reception mech-
anism includes contemporaneous viewing or recording for later
viewing should be irrelevant. Where the subscriber's motives and
practices are private and noncommercial, the burden is on the copy-
right proprietor to show that user or price discrimination is neces-
sary to maintain normal channels of distribution of the work.
113. Cirace, supra note 88, at 682. This analysis concluded that "complete copy-
ing of publicly available copyrighted works for purposes other than profit or sale,
by an 'individual' or his or her agent (e.g., secretary), for the individual or his or her
family's own use, whether by hand, typewriter, photocopying, phonorecording, or
video recording, should be fair use and thus not constitute copyright infringement."
Id.
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B. Special Preview of Legislative Action
Congress is currently considering several legislative initiatives
that could impact on home copying from non-broadcast television
services. These legislative measures generally take one of two
broad approaches: either authorizing copyright owners to prevent
all copying of their works or, alternatively, ensuring consumers'
ability to record in their homes.
The "Motion Picture Anti-Piracy Act of 1991," for example,
would create an exclusive right for copyright owners to protect un-
authorized copying of an audiovisual work through the use of any
process, treatment, or mechanism that prevents or inhibits copying,
such as anti-copy coding of the video signals.114 The legislation
would create civil and criminal sanctions for the manufacture, sale,
or distribution of any equipment or device "the primary purpose or
effect of which is to avoid, bypass, deactivate, or otherwise circum-
vent" such anti-copy protection.11 Although ostensibly aimed to
give statutory protection to copy protection systems such as
Macrovision's encryption on commercial videocassettes,1 1 6 and to
outlaw the so-called "black boxes" used to circumvent such anti-
copy coding, the proposed legislation could also impact home
video recording from cable and pay television services.' 1 7
As a broad copyright measure, this type of legislation is problem-
atic because it would allow cable and satellite operators and copy-
right owners to prevent all unauthorized copying, without provision
for fair use. This approach would reverse prior legislative intent to
allow noncommercial home taping of audiovisual works, and would
strictly limit, for the first time, the home taping aspects of Betamax
III to the specific facts of that case-home taping from over-the-air
broadcast television.
As a technical measure, the particular approach of the Motion
Picture Anti-Piracy Act is also troublesome. While the bill sets forth
a broad-ranging definition of the devices and circuitry it outlaws, it
114. S. 1096, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991) (introduced by Senator Herbert
Kohl of Wisconsin); accord H.R. 2367, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991) (identical
companion bill sponsored by Rep. Howard Berman of California).
115. S. 1096 § 3; H.R. 2367 § 3.
116. Macrovision primarily markets copy protection technology for prerecorded
videocassettes. Sweeting, supra note 12, at 51; Hearing on S. 1096, Motion Pic-
ture Anti-Piracy Act of 1991 Before the Subcomm. on Technology and the Law,
joint with the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1991) (testimony of John
Ryan, Chairman of Macrovision) (noting that in addition to copy protection encryp-
tion for videocassettes, Macrovision is also developing copy protection technolo-
gies for PPV television formats).
117. See Leghorn Statement, supra note 10 (describing Eidak's fledgling copy
protection treatment for audiovisual works transmitted electronically on pay televi-
sion services).
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contains no definition of the circuitry, designs, or even concepts that
would conform to its requirements. Thus, such legislation must inva-
riably chill the design and distribution of conventional television
sets and VCRs, as there can be no assurance of compatibility with all
copy protection treatments or technologies.I i s Moreover, forcing
legislation that relies upon a technological approach to prevent
home recording completely is prone to eventual failure, circumven-
tion, or obsolescence.1 19 As Barbara Ringer, former U.S. Register of
Copyright, opined over twenty years ago, the home video recording
issue should not be addressed by carrying copyright enforcement
into the home, by banning video recording devices, or by imposing
technologies to prevent video recording. 12 0
In an entirely different approach, the "Cable Equipment Act of
1992" ("Amendment") would prohibit cable operators from scram-
bling or otherwise encrypting any local broadcast signal that is of-
fered via cable. 121 The Cable Equipment Act would not, however,
restrict the use of scrambling or encryption technology that does not
interfere with the operation of cable subscribers' televisions or
VCRs.1 '2 This legislation is designed to ensure that cable systems
and converter boxes do not disable the full benefits and special fea-
tures of modem televisions and VCRs, including the ability to rec-
ord programming televised on cable.' 2 '
If enacted, the Cable Equipment Act would ensure that consum-
ers will be entitled to "fair use" of broadcast programming they re-
ceive by cable. The Amendment would also take steps to preclude
118. Under S. 1096, a person would be a copyright infringer if that person:
imports, manufactures, sells or distributes any equipment or device, or any
component or circuitry incorporated into any equipment or device, the pri-
mary purpose or effect of which is to avoid, bypass, deactivate or other-
wise circumvent the process, treatment, mechanism, or system used by the
owner of a copyright to prevent or inhibit copying.
S. 1096, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1991).
119. As the district judge in the Befamax case predicted, even if consumer elec-
tronics manufacturers are ordered to install a "jamming device" to prevent home
taping, "as sure as you and I are sitting in this courtroom today, some bright young
entrepreneur, unconnected with Sony, is going to come up with a device to unjam
the jam. And then we have a device to jam the unjamming of the jam, and we all
end up like jelly." Lardner, supra note 34, at 62-63 (quoting Judge Ferguson).
120. See supra note 33.
121. Senate Amendment No. 1504, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 624A(d)l (1992) (in-
troduced by Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont as an amendment to S. 12, the Cable
TV Consumer Protection Act, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)), reprinted in CONG.
REc. S582 (Jan. 29, 1992). This Senate Amendment offers the substance of S. 2063,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. § l(d) (1991), a bill introduced by Senator Leahy during the
preceding session.
122. Id.
123. See CONG. Rsc. S 583 (Jan. 29, 1992) (statement of Senator Leahy); see also
CoNG. REc. S 18,377-78 (Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Senator Leahy regarding S.
2063).
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cable operators from needlessly interfering with subscribers' use of
their televisions and VCRs. 124 In effect, it codifies the Betamax III
decision. The measure, however, may not ultimately address en-
cryption of other basic cable services, premium cable channels,
PPV, microwave distribution systems, or direct-satellite services.125
Congress has shown increasing sensitivity to consumer complaints
regarding the increasing control copyright holders and pay televi-
sion distributors are demanding over consumer use of pay television
signals. 12' Nevertheless, no comprehensive solution has yet been
offered.
To fully protect the consumer's right to fair use home video re-
cording, this author would propose a simple piece of legislation. 127
The legislation would expressly confirm that home video recording
of lawfully acquired television signals for private, noncommercial
purposes does not constitute copyright infringement. Accordingly,
the legislation would prohibit any copy protection methods or de-
vices (such as signal scrambling, signal encryption, converter boxes,
or descrambling devices) that interfere with consumers' fair use of
124. The requirement for a cable converter box for signal reception prevents
cable viewers from watching a program on one channel while taping another; from
taping two consecutive programs on different channels; from using the TV or VCR
remote control unit; and even from enjoying special features such as "picture-in-a-
picture." See Coso. Rc. at S 582-83 (Jan. 29, 1992) (reprinting S. Amendment No.
1504, § 624A(b), 102d Cong., 2d Sess., and statement of Senator Leahy). The
Cable Equipment Act would help ensure that cable systems are more compatible
with televisions and VCRs, and that the cable is installed to bypass the converter
box wherever possible.
125. The Amendment requires the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
in consultation with representatives of the cable industry and the consumer elec-
tronics industry, to report to Congress regarding "means of assuring compatibility
between televisions and VCRs and cable systems so that cable subscribers will be
able to enjoy the full benefit of both the programming available on cable systems
and the functions available on their televisions and VCRs." S. Amendment No.
1504, § 624A(h), 102d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in CoNG. REo. S 583 (Jan. 29,
1992); see also CoNo. REc. S 583 (Jan. 29, 1992) (statement of Senator Leahy). The
Amendment does not, however, set forth specific guidelines or a policy mandate to
guide the FCC in balancing the various public and private interests so as to assure
that televisions, VCRs, and cable services are "compatible." In particular, it is un-
clear whether the ability to make home recordings from pay television services is
encompassed within the assurance of "compatibility."
126. See, e.g., CONG. REc. S 583 (Jan. 29, 1992) ("Cable operators have every
right to try to protect the security of their premium programming. But they show
little regard for their customers when they choose a means of protection that will
sabotage the customer's television and VCR." (statement of Senator Leahy)); id. at
S 584 ("It is obvious what is going on here, cable operators don't like consumers
having control over the cable signal once it comes into their homes ..... (statement
of Senator Gore)).
127. With respect to such legislation, there are additional considerations, such as
analysis of contributory infringement and benefits conferred on copyright holders
by new technology, that are beyond the scope of this Article.
Pay Television
copyrighted audiovisual works. This would include consumers'
ability to record for private, noncommercial use television signals
that their household is authorized to receive. The legislation would
not preclude the use of signal protection methods to prevent unau-
thorized receipt of television programming if such methods do not
interfere with an individual's private use of lawfully acquired pro-
gramming, including uses that involve private, noncommercial
home recording. The legislation would apply to all commercial
television distribution systems, including basic cable service, pre-
mium cable networks, direct-satellite services, multi-channel micro-
wave distribution systems, and PPV services.
The delicate copyright balance would thus be struck, but not
stricken. On one scale, the legislation would preserve ready, inex-
pensive access to copyrighted works for the consuming public. Au-
thorized subscribers' right to fair use of pay television service would
be upheld. On the other scale, the rights of private copyright pro-
prietors are also upheld. Copyright holders and pay television dis-
tributors would be protected from material impairment to the market
for their copyrighted works by existing laws that prohibit unauthor-
ized reception of pay television signals and commercial piracy of
copyrighted audiovisual works.12
CONCLUSION
Despite the major changes in telecommunications and consumer
electronics technologies during this century, Hollywood has en-
dured and prospered. There is no reason to believe that the rising
popularity and availability of pay television services, combined with
consumer recording of programs delivered by these services, will
undermine the financial incentives for those who create and dis-
tribute motion pictures and television programming. On the con-
trary, history has shown that new technologies provide new
marketing opportunities for copyright holders and program
distributors.
Indeed, consumers thirst for new things, especially new means
and modes of entertainment. The glamour and excitement surround-
ing the release of a new motion picture, the airing of a new hit tele-
vision series, or the debut of an exclusive cable "special" continue
to capture our imagination-regardless of whether such works are
distributed on film, over-the-air, via cable, or by direct-satellite.
New technology will not stifle America's love affair with TV and the
movies.
Yet, in the process of technological development, as new means
to control access to copyrighted audiovisual works emerge, the doc-
trine of fair use, and its representation of the public domain, is in-
128. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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creasingly threatened by claims of proprietors to enhanced return.
The event that was once freely broadcast, and then made available
only on pay cable, will now be offered only on pay-per-view. The
use of further discriminatory monetary and technological means to
control the viewer's mode of use once the audiovisual signal has
been acquired ought to be examined skeptically. "Creative work is
to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ulti-
mately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts.1 129
129. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
